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Layering Law upon Custom:
The British in Colonial West India
James A. Jaffe*
The panchayat, or customary village council, holds an iconic place in
Indian social and political ideology. Largely due to the influence of
Mahatma Gandhi, the panchayat came to possess almost mythic standing as
an indigenous democratic institution that could form the basis for an
authentically Indian democracy. Gandhi’s imagining of the panchayat,
however, was only one of many that circulated among Indian nationalists at
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Few,
if any, of the most prominent nationalist leaders ever had actually seen a
functioning village council. Indeed, by the time of the nationalist
movement, the panchayat, as an institution to order village affairs, had
become largely moribund, although caste panchayats often continued to
regulate the norms and practices of separate castes.1 Nevertheless, the
resurrection of the all-village panchayat became one of the essential
unifying elements of the movement to create a truly national identity.2
A significant portion of the explanation for the survival of the
panchayat ideal lies with the British idealization of the institution. Twice
during the nineteenth century, British administrators in India “discovered,”
romanticized, and attempted to institute a form of panchayati raj, or rule by
panchayat. The first discovery, which will be the focus of this essay, dates
to approximately the first third of the nineteenth century, when several
prominent East India Company military officers sought to adapt the
panchayat to the needs of the British administration of justice, especially in
the newly-conquered regions of southern and western India. To meet these
requirements, the panchayat was put forth as an Indian analog of both the
English jury and European tribunals of arbitration. The second “discovery”
dates to the final third of the nineteenth century. At that time, the
necessities of urban and rural development required new forms of local and
municipal administration. The consequent widespread support among
British administrators in India for political decentralization was expressed
in the form of a new desire to recreate the panchayat, but this time as a
*
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1 JOHN MATTHAI, VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN BRITISH INDIA 181 (1915).
2 C.A. BAYLY, RECOVERING LIBERTIES: INDIAN THOUGHT IN THE AGE OF LIBERALISM AND
EMPIRE 279-90, 347 (2012).
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municipal body in the image of European local administration. Both times,
it should be noted, the panchayat appeared as an instrument of colonial rule
in a form created to meet the demands of British governance and fashioned
by contemporary streams of Western political theory.
The first iteration of the panchayat as a judicial institution was largely
the work of two officer-officials of the East India Company, Thomas
Munro and Mountstuart Elphinstone. Most British officer-officials had
active experience with the panchayat since the British Articles of War
allowed the panchayat to be used both as an arbitral institution to resolve
monetary disputes between soldiers and camp followers and for the courtmartial of sepoy (Indian) troops.3 However, Munro imagined the panchayat
as much more than that. For him, the panchayat was analogous to the
British common law jury and, moreover, was evidence that India possessed
its own common law tradition. In a quote often repeated by East India
Company officials in London, Munro had reported that “there can be no
doubt that the trial by Punchayet is as much the common law of India in
civil matters, as that by Jury is of England.”4
While Munro worked to consolidate the Company’s holdings in
southern India, his fellow officer, Elphinstone, did the same in the West.5
At the end of the Third Anglo-Maratha War in 1818, the Company had
come to occupy an area of approximately 50,000 square miles containing
about 4,000,000 inhabitants in India’s western Deccan. While Elphinstone
shared Munro’s idealization of the panchayat, the two differed sharply over
its functions in practice. For Elphinstone, the panchayat was indeed an
aspect of India’s common law, but it functioned less as an analog of the
English jury system and much more as an analog of an English tribunal of
arbitration.
Elphinstone’s determination to resurrect panchayat justice in the
western Deccan of the Bombay Presidency was certainly among the most
3 See WILLIAM HOUGH & GEORGE LONG, THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL, ALSO THE
LEGAL EXPOSITION AND MILITARY EXPLANATION OF THE MUTINY ACT, AND ARTICLES OF WAR 369-70
(London, Kingsbury, Parbury, & Allen 2d ed. 1825) (Regulation II, enacted 1809); id. at 595-96
(Regulation XX, enacted 1810).
4 Thomas Munro, Report of the Collector of the Ceded Districts 15th August 1807, on the
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Zemindary Permanent Settlements and of the Ryotwar
Settlements, in PAPERS CONCERNING REVENUE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL MATTERS IN INDIA
292-97, IOR/H/686 (1807) (on file with the British Library).
5 See generally KENNETH BALLHATCHET, SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WESTERN
INDIA, 1817-1830 (1957); T.H. BEAGLEHOLE, THOMAS MUNRO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY IN MADRAS, 1792-1818 (1966); MEERA SINGH, BRITISH REVENUE AND
JUDICIAL POLICIES IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY OF DECCAN, 1818-1826 (1994); BURTON STEIN, THOMAS
MUNRO: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLONIAL STATE AND HIS VISION OF EMPIRE (1989); Catherine S.
Meschievitz, Civil Litigation and Judicial Policy in the Madras Presidency, 1800-1843 (1986)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with Law Library, University of
Wisconsin-Madison).
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significant attempts to incorporate customary Indian systems of justice into
the British judicial system. Not only did Elphinstone and his officers
engage in substantive historical and contemporary research on the
panchayat’s activities under the Maratha Peshwa, or Prime Minister, but
they also took a very active role in supervising and promoting its use under
their own administration. By adapting the panchayat to British needs, most
officer-officials believed that they were reviving an ancient and customary
institution that would be welcomed by the people of the country. At the
same time, they also believed that the panchayat had to be reformed and restructured to meet the British government’s present-day needs. The
paradox of attempting to achieve both of these goals did not occur to them.
Perhaps the ultimate failure of British attempts to revive the panchayat
during this era was therefore inevitable.
Elphinstone had first come to India in 1796.6 For many years, he
served at Pune conducting diplomatic relations with the Maratha Peshwa.
However, after the British victory in the Third Anglo-Maratha War,
Elphinstone was given responsibility to occupy and settle the Deccan,
which the Peshwa had been forced to cede to the British. In 1819,
Elphinstone was appointed governor of the Bombay Presidency, a position
he would hold until 1827. Upon the British occupation of the Deccan, the
Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India, permitted Elphinstone “to
establish such temporary measures as he might deem requisite or proper,
and to avail himself of the talents and experience of Brigadier-General
Munro, by inviting assistance from the latter in introducing the British
authority into the southern territory.”7 However, Hastings also ordered that
these temporary measures “were limited to the restoration of [civil
administration] as nearly as might be practicable, to the character of its
original institutions.”8 Elphinstone dutifully followed these orders. In
1818, he ordered his subordinate Collectors to “scrupulously avoid all sorts
of innovations” in order “to show the people that they are to expect no
change but in the better administration of their former laws.”9 Therefore,
British Collectors, who were responsible for the general administration of
individual districts, were to employ former Maratha officials and to
maintain the system whereby the Patails might settle village disputes by
6 C.A. Bayly, Elphinstone, Mountstuart (1779-1859), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY (David Cannadine ed., online ed. 2008), available at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/
article/8752 (last visited May 25, 2011).
7 Letter from the Marquis of Hastings to the Secret Committee (Aug. 21, 1820), in PAPERS
RESPECTING THE PINDARRY AND MAHRATTA WARS 416, 422 (London, J.L. Cox 1824).
8 Similar instructions were issued for the settlement of Nagpur, Pune, and the North-West
Provinces. See id. at 439, 445.
9 Letter from Mountstuart Elphinstone to the Marquis of Hastings (June 18, 1818), in POONA
AFFAIRS (ELPHINSTONE’S EMBASSY), PART II, 1816-18, at 408 (G.S. Sardesai ed., 1950).
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village Punchayets (arbitration). The Mamlutdars would superintend the
trial of more important causes by Punchayets of the most respectable people
within their divisions, while those of greater magnitude and all appeals
would come before the Collector himself assisted also by Punchayets and
Hindoo Lawyers.10
Both East India Company officials in London and Elphinstone himself
made it clear, however, that this was only to be a temporary measure until
the territory was settled; further improvements would then be made. For his
part, Elphinstone appeared somewhat confident that relatively few
substantive reforms would be needed in the future. He wrote,
[t]he present system is probably not bad in itself as the country has
prospered under it notwithstanding the feebleness and corruption
which it was administered. At all events it is generally known and
understood; it suits the people whom indeed it has helped form, and it
is probably capable of being made tolerably perfect by gradual
improvements introduced as they appear to be called for.11
John Adam, Hastings’s Chief Secretary, however, was not as sanguine
and suggested that significant reforms would eventually be forthcoming.
“Such a system [of the panchayat],” he noted, “while it not only secures in
the most satisfactory manner of which present circumstances admit, the
ends of essential equity, will form the best possible basis for such future
ameliorations as the superior integrity and intelligence of the British Agents
may enable them to introduce.”12
By the following year, 1819, Elphinstone, then serving as
Commissioner of the Deccan, had become convinced that in the
administration of civil law “our principal instrument must continue to be the
Punchayet” and that the panchayat was “the great instrument in the
administration of Justice.”13 It is not exactly clear why or when his
previously qualified support had given way to such a vigorous endorsement
of the panchayat. Munro’s influence may very well have been of great
importance, but, as noted above, the two did not share the same
understanding or interpretation of the function of the panchayat. Whereas
Munro believed that the panchayat was analogous to the English jury,

10

Id. at 410.
Id.
12 Letter from John Adam to Mountstuart Elphinstone (Sept. 26, 1818), in POONA AFFAIRS
(ELPHINSTONE’S EMBASSY), PART II, 1816-1818, at 478 (G.S. Sardesai ed., 1950).
13 MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, REPORT ON THE TERRITORIES CONQUERED FROM THE
PAISHWA 78, 99 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (1821). An initial version of the Report was completed
in October 1819 and circulated to Elphinstone’s Collectors. Circular of the Honble the Commissioner to
the Collectors in the Newly Acquired Territories from the Late Paishwa (Oct. 25, 1819), in BOMBAY
PROCEEDINGS 1820-1829, IOR/P/398/71 (1820) (British Library).
11
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Elphinstone thought it much more akin to a board or tribunal of arbitration.
In English practice and in English law, these were obviously significantly
different institutions with significantly different legal authority. Perhaps of
greatest significance was the fact that, in England, arbitration was a wholly
voluntary process. Further, arbitration suits were pursued largely beyond
the purview of the courts; decisions were based upon equity and not
precedent; the process was free of pleadings, fees, and lawyers; and an
arbitration tribunal lacked any means of enforcing its award. These
qualities obviously would not apply if the panchayat were deemed a “native
jury.”
Nevertheless, as Commissioner of the Deccan, Elphinstone quickly
began to make significant inquiries into the jurisdiction and procedures of
panchayats. His roughly-penciled notes indicate what he understood to be
some of its principal advantages:
Old appeals says Gen Munro were always [stated?] to be made
because [there?] had been no Punchayet or because the cause was tried
before a [illegible] officer[.] The natives have no confidence in any
plan but punchayets.
The Ct. attribute the success of the best Collectors to their leaving
the detailed management of affairs to the natives according to the
existing [?] forms & usages of the Country & to see they do their duty
instead of attempting to do it for them.
Complaints to be made to Assistants or referred to them by the
Courts either party may demand a Punchayet . . . .
Punchayets on revenue suits particularly recommended by the
Fortescue.14
As early as December 1817, a circular had been sent to the various
judicial officers in the Presidency inquiring whether the panchayat system
could be adapted there as it had been in Madras under Munro.15 The
response from the judges was noticeably mixed. Much of the muddle was
apparently caused by the confusion between their perception of the
panchayat as an arbitration tribunal or the panchayat as a jury trial. Thus,
Saville Marriott, the Collector of the Northern Konkan, described the
panchayat as a “mode of trial,” while S. Babington, the Judge and
Magistrate at Tannah, assumed that judgment by the panchayat was “the
judgment of arbitrators.”16 Elphinstone also circulated to his principal
14

Mountstuart Elphinstone, Notes, in PAPERS OF MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE ON THE POWER
PATELS AND PUNCHAYETS, ETC. 63-65, Mss Eur F88/408 (1819) (British Library) (emphasis in
original).
15 Bombay Judicial Proceedings (Dec. 27, 1817), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: PROCEEDINGS AND
CONSULTATIONS 1702-1945, IOR/P/398/69 (British Library).
16 Bombay Judicial Proceedings, supra note 15, at 160-61, 168-69.
OF THE
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subordinates questionnaires on the Peshwa’s administration of law in the
territories. These were quite lengthy, comprising well over a hundred
questions, many of which related in some way or other to the form and
function of panchayats.17 The responses provided to Elphinstone thus
provide a contemporary account of how British officer-officials first
understood the work of the panchayat as well as the processes involved in
securing panchayat justice.
Significantly, the responses to this
questionnaire did not always coincide with one another. It is difficult to
ascertain whether the discrepancies indicate local differences in the
functioning of the panchayat or whether the officer-officials themselves
misapprehended the processes involved.
Nevertheless, when taken
together, the officer-officials’ responses provide a unique view of how the
British came to understand the panchayat system in the Deccan when they
first sought to adapt it for their purposes. At the very least, the responses’
importance lies in the fact that the British administration of justice in the
region would be substantially based upon these initial perceptions and
misperceptions for the next two decades.
Four of the five principal regional officer-officials under Elphinstone
provided written answers to the questionnaire: Captain Henry Pottinger,
Collector in Ahmednagar; Captain John Briggs, Political Agent in
Khandesh; Captain James Grant, Resident at Satara; and William Chaplin,
the only civilian, Collector at Dharwar and soon-to-be Commissioner of the
Deccan. The fifth, Captain H.D. Robertson, the Collector of Pune, may
very well have been in personal contact with Elphinstone. There was
universal agreement among them that the panchayat decided local disputes
that could not be resolved through the personal intervention of the village
headman (patel). Pottinger explained, for example, that a panchayat was
convened to settle disputes only after “amicable arbitration” had failed.18
The respondents also agreed that the authority to convene a panchayat lay
exclusively with the patel. Hence, they argued, the revival of the ancient
panchayat to a great extent depended upon maintaining the patel’s
authority. Together, an active patel and an effective panchayat constituted
the essential administrative foundation for Elphinstone’s ryotwari system of
revenue collection and peasant proprietorship in the Presidency.19
The patels were, as Elphinstone put it, “the most important
17 Different selections from the questionnaire and the response are reproduced in H. GEORGE
FRANKS, PANCHAYETS UNDER THE PESHWAS, 77-80, App. No. 1 (Poona Star Press ed., 1930) and R. D.
CHOKSEY, TWILIGHT OF THE MARATHA RAJ, 1818, at viii-xii (R.D. Choksey ed., 1976). Both books are
based on the Poona Residency Daftar in the Pune Archives. Franks, in particular, provides a reliable,
albeit dated, guide to the panchayat system as it was being adapted by the British.
18 Choksey, supra note 17, at 61.
19 The various later interpretations of the “sociological” connection between the panchayat and
the land revenue system are analyzed in RONALD INDEN, IMAGINING INDIA (1990).
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functionaries in the villages, and perhaps the most important class in the
country.”20 Not only was the patel responsible for the administration of
justice through both his personal arbitration of disputes and the convening
of panchayats, but he also was head of the village police and watchmen.
Moreover, he was responsible for the collection of the revenue and
essentially functioned as the representative of the village’s needs and
interests. Therefore, as Elphinstone realized, the patel was a critical
intermediary: he was both an agent of government and a representative of
the people. The patel, he wrote, “is not less useful in executing the order of
the Government, than in asserting the rights, or at least making known the
wrongs, of the people.”21
While the patel possessed the authority to convene a panchayat, there
were various explanations as to how the panchayat process might be
initiated. According to Pottinger, a panchayat could be “demanded” by the
litigants, after which the patel “gave his permission to one being
assembled.” Grant, however, simply indicated that the patel “had [the]
power to call a Punchayet or not as he judged proper.”22 In Briggs’s report
from Khandesh, a third possibility was described in which the parties
themselves took their dispute “to the patails and elders of the village when
they sat as is customary under some large tree at the village gate of an
evening.”23
There was, however, fundamental agreement that panchayats were a
voluntary mode of settlement and that litigants could not be compelled to
accept their intervention in disputes. Thus Elphinstone’s Report on the
Territories Conquered from the Paishwa described Maratha practice as
follows: “the Patail assembled a Punchayet of inhabitants of the Village,
who enquired into the matter with very little form, and decided as they
thought best; but their decision could not take place without the previous
consent of the parties.”24 As Captain Briggs later wrote, “It is one of the
invariable rules of the Punchayut as it was originally instituted for the
object of doing Justice, not to enter upon business without having the
consent of both parties to abide by their judgement.”25 In this respect, the
panchayat was often compared to the system of English arbitration, and
members of panchayats often were referred to in Company accounts as
arbitrators.

20

Elphinstone, supra note 13, at 21.
Id. at 22.
22 Choksey, supra note 17, at 61.
23 Id. at 64.
24 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 57.
25 Bombay Judicial Consultations, Briggs to Chaplin (May 31, 1822), in INDIA OFFICE
RECORDS: BOMBAY PROCEEDINGS 1823-1830, IOR/P/399/23 (British Library).
21
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Once a panchayat was called, the process of selecting its members was
of paramount importance. Chaplin and Pottinger agreed that the parties
themselves were allowed to choose their own representatives to serve on the
tribunal.26 There were no prerequisites for service on a panchayat, although
some sort of “respectability” was often referred to. Thus, Chaplin noted
that the members of panchayats were comprised of “respectable ryots,
merchants, persons out of employ living upon their means or others who
were supposed capable of the duty,” while Grant described them as “the
more intelligent villagers,” and noted “outcastes and any low castes were
excluded.”27 Yet Pottinger also reported, “there was no rule or even
established custom on this point. In general disputants selected their friends
of whatever rank they might be.”28 Thus, British officials later thought it
necessary to decide whether eligibility requirements should apply to the
members of panchayats. In this, they subsequently accepted what they
believed was customary practice. They determined that service on the
panchayat was to be open to all adult males and that the litigants were to be
free to select their own representatives.
The number of people who would serve on a panchayat was also open
to question. The term “panchayat” is derived from the Hindi word “panch,”
or “five.” The prevailing notion was that, under the Marathas, two
representatives were selected by each litigant while a presiding fifth
member, the sarpanch, directed the proceedings and represented the state.29
Thus, it was reported that in petty matters the village clerk (karkun) would
often serve as sarpanch, while in more significant ones the Maratha district
officer (mamledar) might do so.30 However, it is quite clear that this
number could vary widely.31 Some panchayats, as Briggs suggested,
comprised all the male elders of the village.32 Elsewhere, in an important
inheritance case heard under British authority in 1819, there were seven
members of the panchayat.33 William Charmier, an Assistant Judge at
Dindori, explained, “there is a notion that a punchaiet always consisted of
five persons which as far as I can ascertain does not appear to be the case.
When first instituted it most probably was so but that such has been the case
26

CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 65, 66.
CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 63, 65.
28 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 66.
29 FRANKS, supra note 17, at 15.
30 Id. at 14, 15.
31 Id.
32 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 64.
33 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, CIVIL JUDICATURE, Minute on the Proceeding of Captain Robertson
and Mr. Lumsden on Their Award in the Disputed Claim of Luximon Row Sadasew and Mulhar Row
Appa (July 7, 1821), in EAST INDIA COMPANY PAPERS: MUNKESHUR’S APPEAL 10/10 (Maharashtra
State Archives).
27
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latterly I mean for many years, I can no where find out.”34 British officials
therefore eventually found it necessary to regularize both the size of the
panchayat and the position of sarpanch when integrating the panchayat into
their system of judicial administration.
British officials perhaps welcomed the fact that panchayat justice was
often encumbered by a significant amount of documentation, something
they found recognizable although not necessarily entirely comprehensible.
Perhaps inevitably, therefore, panchayat procedural documents soon
became equated to their supposed British cognates and thus integrated into
the British system of justice. The razeenamah, for example, which
Elphinstone explained as the “consent of the parties to the arbitration” by
panchayat, soon enough became understood as equivalent to an English
“bond,” legally binding the litigants to accept the award of an arbitrator.35
Other forms of documentation bore a much closer resemblance to English
legal forms and thus were also readily assimilated. The sarounsh, for
example, an abstract of the panchayat’s decision, was easily adopted as
equivalent to an English arbitrator’s “award.”
Enforcement was perhaps the final area of panchayat justice that the
British sought to reform and regularize. Chaplin reported that the
enforcement of a panchayat’s decision was often the responsibility of
various officials, including the village accountant, district officer, or village
watchman.36 However, Pottinger indicated that enforcement could also be
executed by “personal authority.”37 He was undoubtedly referring to the
practice of tukaza, a term one mid-nineteenth-century dictionary defines as
“dunning” or “exacting.”38 It is fair to say that British officials sometimes
were appalled by the practice, which came in a variety of forms.
Elphinstone explained that tukaza included “every thing from simple
importunity up to placing a guard over a man, preventing his eating, tying
him neck and heels, or making him stand on one leg, with a heavy stone on
his head, under a vertical sun.”39 Chaplin argued that tukaza often
amounted “to a degree of torture.”40
However, there was disagreement among British officials as to
34

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, William Charmier, Assistant Judge, Dindoree, to Saville Marriot
(Apr. 24, 1827), in EAST INDIA COMPANY PAPERS: ANNUAL AND PERIODICAL REPORTS 1/127
(Maharashtra State Archives).
35 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 59, 74.
36 Id. at 65.
37 Id. at 67.
38 CHARLES PHILIP BROWN, THE ZILLAH DICTIONARY, IN THE ROMAN CHARACTER:
EXPLAINING THE VARIOUS WORDS USED IN BUSINESS IN INDIA 120 (1852). ELPHINSTONE also defined
tukaza as “dunning” in REPORT ON THE TERRITORIES CONQUERED FROM THE PAISHWA, at 64 (1821).
39 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 64.
40 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 65.
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whether tukaza was intended to enforce a panchayat’s award or whether it
was intended to forcefully encourage potential litigants to submit their
dispute to a panchayat. Ultimately, Elphinstone adopted the latter
interpretation. In his 1819 Circular on the use of panchayats, he wrote, “it
is absolutely necessary to prohibit the use of force, but all restraints and
inconveniences that depend on the point of honor ought to be allowed to
remain” because “if done away entirely, the great principle which drives
men to Punchauts, private arbitrations and voluntary compositions, is put an
end to, and every creditor is compelled to come to Court.”41 Similarly,
W.R. Morris, Captain Grant’s Assistant Political Agent, explained how the
reformed tukaza system operated in Satara:
Tukazza or Tukada as it is termed in this Country still continue to
exist, although it is never carried to such lengths as it was under the
former Government; during that period there were four different
descriptions of it constantly practised; that of obliging a person to
stand in the sun to perform the same with a heavy weight upon his
head, or with one of his feet raised up; to seat a man at the door of his
house and prevent him eating during the day, or to keep him confined
in his house & oblige him to afford provision for the man who was
seated at his door. In order to abolish the two former of these, orders
have been issued strictly forbidding any recourse to violence, for the
purpose of effecting a settlement of debts, but any one is at liberty to
try and enforce such arrangement by either of the two latter expedients
which are generally put in practice for one or two days, after which the
plaintiff comes and lays his complaint before the Mamletdar or the
Nyadeish.42
In Pune, on the other hand, tukaza was understood as a form of postconviction punishment. There, imprisonment for debt had been a common
practice under the Maratha government and continued to be so under the
British. In 1822, Chaplin reported, “no definite rules have been established
in regards to the period of imprisonment for debt, if the debtor failed to
satisfy the demand upon him, creditors requiring the confinement of debtors
pay them subsistence.”43 H.D. Robertson, the Pune Collector, suggested
however, that imprisonment was considered to be an alternative to tukaza.
He wrote:
41

Circular of the Honble the Commissioner, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOMBAY PROCEEDINGS
1820-1829, IOR/P/398/71 (British Library).
42 Replies to Supplemental Queries by Mr. Morris (No. 2), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOARD’S
COLLECTIONS 1820S, IOR/F/4/839/22429 (British Library). The nyadeish, more commonly spelled
nyayadesh, was the chief justice minister under the Marathas.
43 From the Commissioner in the Deccan (Aug. 20, 1822), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOMBAY
REVENUE PROCEEDINGS, IOR/P/368/34 (British Library).
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Tuggaza is not carried to excess, and many prefer placing their debtors
under restraint in the Debtor’s Jail to resorting to it. This is especially
the case where the Debtor being rather respectable may be afraid of
losing his character by being thrown into Prison, the threat of which
frequently makes him pay his debt.44
Nevertheless, the panchayats themselves possessed no direct power of
enforcement.
Their decrees were implemented either through an
individual’s “personal authority,” such as a tukaza, or the intervention of
the state.45 In cases of debt, this involved the seizure and sale of property to
fulfill the terms of the panchayat award. In the Deccan, Chaplin noted,
“decrees are executed in the usual manner by distraint of property and
personal restraint, if necessary. Houses are sometimes sold, but the
implements of trades are usually, spared, unless no other property be forth
coming.”46
As British reforms of the panchayat proceeded, it sometimes became
clear that attempts to restrict the use of tukaza adversely affected the poor’s
access to justice. In 1823, for example, the enforcement of panchayat
awards was formally delegated to the civil magistrates (munsifs) and
mamledars whose actions had to be authorized by the Collector. However,
the delay involved in getting that authorization, it was reported, often
proved to be a hardship upon poorer litigants. Without the threat of direct
violent action, poor litigants often did not have the means to initiate a
tukaza since, at the very least, this required the employment of a peon to
stay outside the home of the debtor. Tukaza, therefore, became a weapon of
the rich against the poor. Chaplin subsequently indicated that further
regulation might be necessary to correct this unintended consequence. “It is
said,” he wrote,
[T]hat those who have means of exercising Tugazar have pressed the
execution of Decrees in their favor before the expiration of the period
allowed for appealing. It will require the Judges’ attention to correct
these defects and abuses, but no sale of property should ever take place
in my opinion without his previous sanction. The appointment of
persons specially responsible for the legal seizure and distraint of
goods and chattels under Decrees of Court will perhaps be eventually
necessary.47
44 Extract from Revenue Consultations connected with the Commissioners report of the 10
August 1822—not included in the Judicial Consultations, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOARD’S
COLLECTIONS 1825-6, IOR/F/4/837/22427 (British Library).
45 CHOKSEY, supra note 17, at 67.
46 From the Commissioner in the Deccan, supra note 43.
47 Papers of East India Company, Letter from William Chaplin to D. Greenhill (Dec. 14, 1825),
in 1 ANNUAL AND PERIODICAL REPORTS (1826) (Maharashtra State Archives).
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While the observations of Company officers were being solicited,
Elphinstone also sought the advice of local Hindu law scholars (shastris)
and undertook the investigation of panchayat practices under Ram Shastri
Prabhune, the legendarily incorruptible chief justice (nyayadesh) of the
Peshwas during the late eighteenth century.48 From these investigations, it
is clear that the eighteenth-century panchayat also had been encumbered by
many rules and therefore need not be romanticized as an informal
community-based institution of dispute resolution. The responses of three
shastris survive. Although the evidence does not make this precisely clear,
it appears that these shastris were all from Pune and that one, or perhaps
two, served under Ram Shastri. Thus, the picture they present is one of the
panchayat as it functioned in a courtly urban environment at the heart of the
central administration of the Maratha government and not in the village
community.
Nevertheless, British officials, and Elphinstone in particular, valued
these “authentic” sources as the foundation upon which to rebuild the
panchayat system under British authority. In the Report on the Territories
Conquered from the Paishwa, Elphinstone explained that such historical
research was necessary for a full understanding of the panchayat. “The
Punchayet,” he wrote, “may therefore be considered as the great instrument
in the administration of Justice, and it is of consequence to determine how
the assembly was constituted, what were its powers, and what its method of
proceeding and enforcing, or procuring the enforcement of its decrees.”49
Certainly, much of this historicist perspective can be attributed to the
Orientalist perspective that several important Company officer-officials,
including Elphinstone, brought to their work in India.50 This perspective
necessitated an understanding of the ancient constitution of the country in
order to revive it. Thus while the observations of Elphinstone’s subordinate
officials on the panchayat were important to the British, the remarks of the
shastris were equally vital.
The most extensive responses to the British investigation were those
provided by Ragopunt Tutte who had served under Ram Shastri and also
had provided information to Arthur Steele for his influential book, The Law
and Custom of Hindoo Castes (1826). Additional replies survive from two
other shastris, Nukka Ram and Rumeshur, the latter of whom may also
have served under Ram Shastri.51 Two of the three shastris agreed that
48 Gune indicates that the panchayat “became the accepted principal of law” only during the
mid-eighteenth century when the Peshwas came to control the Maratha government. See V.T. GUNE,
JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE MARATHAS 47-50 (1953).
49 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 76.
50 MARTHA MCLAREN, BRITISH INDIA AND BRITISH SCOTLAND, 1780-1830: CAREER BUILDING.
EMPIRE BUILDING, AND A SCOTTISH SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ON INDIAN GOVERNANCE (2001).
51 The investigation into the practices during Ram Shastri’s time appears to have been

2014]

Layering Law upon Custom

97

there were two types of panchayats: those that were convened by the
government, and those that were organized within each caste or profession
and independent of government interference.52 A third shastri, Nukka Ram,
whose remarks were very brief and quite sketchy, only indicated that a local
judicial official (amin) was present at all panchayats.53
Both Ragopunt and Rumeshur remarked that convening a panchayat
without government oversight often required the authority or influence of
someone of substance. Thus, Rumeshur noted, “Every man who [had]
power enough to enforce the decision of a Punchaet could assemble one.”54
However, personal influence was not absolutely necessary. Without it, a
government karkun might be assigned to assist the panchayat, especially to
ensure the attendance of all those concerned in the suit. Ragopunt
explained that among bankers,
[I]f there was no Banker of sufficient weight to assemble the
Punchayet [illegible] & to make the Members & Witnesses attend
them they met above the Sircar Houses & a Govt. Carcoon was
appointed to do this for them. This Carcoon though he sat with them
had no voice in the Punchayet but was merely a link between it & the
Govt. He was the executive officer of the Punchayet in doing all that
could not be done without the influence of a Govt. Officer in
assembling Witnesses & Parties &c. He might offer his advice but it
was not incumbent on the Punchayet to receive it.55
The shastris appeared to have had almost exclusive experience with
government-sponsored panchayats, or at least provided the most details
about them. Government-sponsored panchayats were convened by the
government itself, and a karkun appointed a guard to ensure the attendance
undertaken by two of Elphinstone’s subordinates at Pune, Lieutenant Macleod and William Lumsden,
and much of their findings were later incorporated into Elphinstone’s Report on the Territories
Conquered from the Paishwa. See supra note 13. Macleod notes that two of the people he employed in
his court (kachari) had also served under Ram Shastri. See Papers from Mountstuart Elphinstone,
Lieutenant Macleod to Elphinstone, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE
LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS OF PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408
(British Library).
52 Papers from Montstuart Elphinstone, Queries on Punchaits and answers by Raggopunt Tuttee,
in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS
OF PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).
53 Papers from Montstuart Elphinstone, Observations of Punchaets by Nukka Ram Pundit, in
INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS OF
PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).
54 Papers from Montstuart Elphinstone, Rumeshurs Account of Punchait, in INDIA OFFICE
RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE POWERS OF PATAILS AND
PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).
55 Papers from Mountstuart Elphinstone, Queries on Punchaits and Answers by Raggopunt
Tuttee, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: NOTES, MEMORANDUM AND RELATIVE LETTERS REGARDING THE
POWERS OF PATAILS AND PUNCHAYETS, C. 1819, IOR/Mss Eur F 88/408 (British Library).
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of the members, the litigants, and the witnesses. Both Ragopunt and
Rumeshur indicated that the government had the authority to imprison both
the defendant and the witnesses if they did not respond to the panchayat’s
order. Ragopunt added that the government also had the authority to “place
a Mahussul over the contumacious person.”56 This, like tukaza, involved
placing one or more peons who had to be fed at the delinquent’s door.57
The government also had extraordinary powers to convene panchayats.
Ram Shastri, it was reported, authorized regional administrators (sirkars)
and mamledars to hear cases and then put the evidence before a panchayat.
The mamledar was not required to accept the panchayat’s verdict although
he did have the authority to inquire further into the matter. The government
could also refer cases to karkuns; however, in these instances, the clerk
acted more as an interested observer. Rumeshur explained, “a Karkoon of
Govt. often sat with a Punchait (for the purpose of influence) but he was
never considered so much a member that he could not be excluded [from?]
their sittings whenever the Punch wished to deliberate apart.”58
In all government cases, the panchayat was composed of members
selected separately to represent them by each of the litigants. They also
retained the right to object to the government’s appointees, which they
apparently often did. Nukka Ram noted,
[T]he Govt. added such members [to the panchayat] as it thought
proper and always had a Govt. Officer present who kept every thing in
motion, and superintended & conducted generally the proceedings
shaping and preparing the whole for the consideration of the members.
The parties would object to every Member proposed by the Officers of
Government, and on the other hand the Sirkar often rejected unworthy
members proposed by either party.59
The enforcement of panchayat decrees was also the responsibility of
government and, once again, there were notable differences between the
treatment of the rich and poor. While the poor could be subject to
imprisonment for refusing to abide by a panchayat’s award, the rich
generally could not. Rumeshur indicated that the first step taken to
persuade a recalcitrant rich person to perform an award involved
government officials “sitting in his house & demeaning him & sometimes
keeping him from eating for three or four days.”60 In the cases of both rich
and poor, however, the next step was to confiscate property, although there
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See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Id.
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Id.
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were certain limits. The houses of neither the rich nor poor appear to have
been subject to confiscation. For a poor person, his tools or farm
implements also were exempt. “His effects . . . were sold,” Ragopunt said,
“but with great consideration so as not to effect his entire ruin.”61 A rich
person, on the other hand, appears to have had no such special exemption,
Ragopunt noting that even his horses could be taken.
British officials hoped to ensure that, under their administration, the
panchayat would be resurrected as an efficient, accessible, and inexpensive
system of justice. Therefore, many questions sought to uncover existing
problems that were believed to be hampering the efficiency of the
panchayat system. However, as we shall see, it was in the attempt to rectify
these perceived problems that the British most seriously undermined their
own admitted goal to rule by “the customs of the country.”62 Among the
most common complaints expressed to Elphinstone was the dilatoriness of
panchayat proceedings, the difficulty of securing members to serve, and the
potential for bribery and other forms of corruption. By 1819, Elphinstone
had already distributed a Circular to his Collectors cautiously outlining the
reforms that were necessary “to purify, and invigorate the native system.”63
According to these orders, the jurisdiction of village panchayats was to be
limited to cases valued at 150 Rupees or less; employment of professional
pleaders (vakils) was prohibited; suits for debts had to be instituted within
twelve years; and property suits within sixty years of the origination of the
dispute.64 Elphinstone indicated that several further reforms might be
necessary but withheld any decision for the time being.
After 1819, the inefficiencies of the panchayat system of justice
plagued the Collectors and other British judicial officials. Ultimately, suits
brought before panchayats formed only a fraction of the cases within the
British system of justice. Nevertheless, the correspondence from these
officer-officials reveals an immense amount of frustration at being ordered
to make the panchayat “the great instrument in the administration of
Justice,” but, at the same time, to “clear the books” of their accumulating
caseloads in the districts under their command. Their chief complaint was
the length of time it took for a panchayat to convene, hear a case, and reach
a decision. One example will suffice to illustrate the nature of these
complaints, but there were a great many more like it. George Giberne, the
Register at Ahmednagar, explained to Henry Pottinger, the Collector, that

61

Id.
John Adam, Letter to Mountstuart Elphinstone, in POONA RESIDENCY CORRESPONDENCE,
supra note 12, at 478.
63 Circular of the Honorable Commissioner, in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOMBAY PROCEEDINGS
(1820-29) IOR/P/398/71 (British Library).
64 Id.
62
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the panchayat was, in theory, both “expeditious” and “beautiful.”65 In many
ways, he suggested, it “may even be considered Superior to our far famed
British Courts where the parties can only object to, not choose, their Jury,
and on account of the variety of forms and intricate law questions, few men
are capable of pleading their own causes.”66 However, the reality of the
panchayat system was much different. “It is now my intention,” he wrote,
“to shew the difference between that beautiful theory and the present base
practice.” Giberne went on to explain:
In the first place a person makes a complaint and shews good cause to
have an investigation [made?] into his case, the Defendant argues the
Plaintiff’s right and in short a Punchaiet is ordered; the parties give the
necessary Security to abide by the decision, and write down the names
of the members they select; they commence sitting upon [the?]
question, but [now?] one day, half of the members will attend, the next
day not so many, the day after very likely not one; and for several
successive days, sometimes indeed weeks, nothing whatever will be
accomplished; in this case what is to be done. The Custom is, to send a
Peon to exhort them to attend, and this must be done four or five times
a week, and even then the attendance is precarious.67
British officers and officials further complained that it was also often
difficult to find people who were willing to serve on a panchayat. Many
argued that too few people were willing to take the time away from their
businesses or other personal pursuits, and this compounded the problem of
delays and postponements. Thus, Capt. Pottinger reported,
[T]he Members [of a panchayat] usually consider it a tax on their time,
and are careless as to the question before them unless they have an
interest at stake either directly or indirectly. In the latter event they are
partial, and in the former they are inattentive, and occupy them selves
[sic] with any thing else than that which should demand their whole
thoughts.68
As early as January 1819, Capt. Briggs in Khandesh requested the
authority to pay the members of a panchayat in order to encourage
participation.69 Elphinstone quickly refused the request noting that the
payment of panchayat members “would take away the principal motive they
65

Papers of East India Company, Letter from George Giberne to Captain Pottinger (Aug. 1,
1822), in 9A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUDICATURE (1823) (Maharashtra State Archives).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Letter from Pottinger to Elphinstone (Oct. 29, 1818), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: 20 BENGAL
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, DECEMBER 12, 1818, IOR/P/121/28 (British Library).
69 Letter from Briggs to Elphinstone (Jan. 20, 1819), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: 27 BENGAL
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, FEBRUARY 13, 1819, IOR/P/121/40 (British Library).
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now have to use Dispatch.”70 However, Briggs continued to believe that
such payments would improve the panchayat system. Three years later, he
was still lamenting,
[A]t a very early period I perceived the great reluctance with which
almost all persons attended Punchayuts excepting on occasions where
Cast was concerned, and I accordingly recommended that an
allowance should be granted to the members while sitting, but it was
considered that it might be an encouragement to them to delay
decision, and it was not authorized, and has therefore never been again
agitated.71
Among the most grievous complaints, however, were often those
alleging bribery or corruption, and these grievances were very often
suffused with racist condemnations of Indian culture and character. Once
again, one example here represents many others. Capt. Pottinger, who
otherwise might be considered a staunch advocate of the panchayat system,
wrote in 1818:
The system of receiving Bribes in adjusting all disputes was universal
before the War, and has taken such deep root that nothing but time and
the example of an upright and good Government will extirpate it. I
have been obliged to turn apparently respectable Brahmuns and
Soukars ignominiously out of the Court, when it has been shown that
they took a few Rupees from each of the Parties on whose cause I had
requested them to sit. On such occasions they have acted with great
effrontery and showed no symptoms of remorse at their disgrace. The
better classes of our subjects, I am grieved to say seem to me to be
deficient in almost every fine or honorable sentiment, and a total
absence of a sense of shame is a marked deformity in their characters;
My anxious and fullest endeavours have been, and are directed to
reform this degraded state of the Native Society, and I trust my
exertions will not be unavailing.72
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Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, Letter from Briggs to William Chaplin
(May 3, 1822), in 9 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUDICATURE (1822) (Maharashtra State Archives).
Nevertheless, Briggs, who later became the Resident at Satara, remained a staunch advocate of the
panchayat. See BRIGGS, LETTERS ADDRESSED TO A YOUNG PERSON IN INDIA: CALCULATED TO AFFORD
INSTRUCTION FOR HIS CONDUCT IN GENERAL, AND MORE ESPECIALLY IN HIS INTERCOURSE WITH THE
NATIVES 176 (London, 1828) (stating, with regard to the panchayat, that “I can with truth assert, that it
is a most simple, cheap, and efficient mode of administering justice, and is admirably calculated for a
people situated as is the present state of Indian society.”).
72 Letter from Pottinger to Elphinstone (Sept. 10, 1818), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: 49 BENGAL
POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, OCTOBER 10, 1818, IOR/P/121/22 (British Library).
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In the summer of 1822, H. D. Robertson, the Collector at Pune, sought
further advice from the local shastris and amins as to how best to remedy
the perceived ills of the panchayat system. To do this, he employed the
services of Harry Borradaile whose indefatigable labors produced both the
Reports of the Civil Causes adjudged by the Court of Sudur Udalut for the
Presidency of Bombay (1825), the first of its kind in western India, and the
massive compilation of Gujarat Caste Rules, which would lay unpublished
for more than half a century. As was the case when Elphinstone sought the
advice of the shastris in 1819, the Pune experience of the shastris and
amins in 1822 was unlikely to have reflected panchayat practices outside of
the city. Yet, their testimony is most revealing for the fact that there was a
general agreement among them that to be effective, the panchayat needed to
become more systematized and regularized. In a word, the panchayat
needed to be bureaucratized. One should be careful, however, to
distinguish between whether the respondents had previously believed that
panchayat reforms were essential, or whether, when asked, the
interrogatories necessitated the articulation of both grievances and
suggestions for reform that heretofore had lain dormant. That is, the
question remains as to whether the shastris and amins would have thought
it necessary to recommend further reforms to the panchayat system if they
had not been prompted to do so by British officials. In this regard, unlike
the extensive documentation of the complaints of British officers and
judicial officials, there is no surviving evidence to suggest that either the
shastris or the amins had previously proposed or demanded reform.
Nevertheless, many of the panchayat reforms later adopted by
Elphinstone reflect the suggestions collected by Borradaile.
The
introduction of a variety of fines to ensure that panchayats functioned
expeditiously was the most common recommendation.73 Wishnoo Kushen,
a Pune amin, suggested fines be imposed upon either litigants or witnesses
who delayed the panchayat’s proceedings. He explained,
[M]any Plaintiffs, after giving in their petition stay away for many
days, and when they do reappear there is considerable delay from the
Defendant, who refuses or puts off giving an answer; and there is delay
on both sides in collecting all the papers, so that a considerable time
elapses before the business is prepared to be laid before the Punchayet.
It is recommended above all, however, that when all the papers are
collected, and the list of evidence given in, that some penalty should
be inforced [sic] both on Plaintiffs and Defendants and witnesses, who
do not attend when wanted.74

73
74

Mr. Morris, Replies to Supplemental Queries, supra note 42, at 16-42.
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Chintanum Leley, a shastri, further recommended that both parties be
required to promise that their version of events is true “and that if found to
be false they will submit to be fined.”75
The imposition of time limits on panchayat proceedings was also
frequently suggested or specifically recommended. The amin Anunrow
Pandooring submitted a variety of time restrictions depending upon the type
of case being adjudicated.76 However, in no case was a panchayat to take
longer than six weeks to come to a decision.77 Others were much less
definite about the time restrictions that might be necessary. Wishnoo
indicated only, “I recommend strongly that the Punchayet should be bound
to a particular time to decide in,”78 while Chintamun advocated that “when
a suit is referred to a Punchayet, the Punchayet ought to be bound to settle it
within a given time, otherwise the Suit to be rendered liable to be taken
from before it, and referred by Government to any one person it may please
to appoint.”79
The variety of other recommendations for reform indicates further
areas in which delays were experienced. From Anunrow’s extensive set of
suggestions we can infer that many hurdles had to be overcome even before
a panchayat could begin to hear a dispute. One problem might arise if only
one of the litigants sought to refer their case to a panchayat while the other
preferred a judge, and another if the parties could not agree upon the
sarpanch of the panchayat. In either case, Anunrow urged greater
government intervention to resolve the deadlock leaving much of the
ultimate authority in the hands of the regional sirkar.80
A still further delay might be caused by the failure to secure the
attendance of the defendant before the panchayat. Anunrow recommended
the employment of sepoys to deliver written summonses to defendants who
would then be provided with a receipt noting the time and date of their
appearance. In the event that the defendant was able to avoid being served
or the sepoy accepted a bribe to report that the defendant could not be
found, then “either fining him or letting judgment go against him would be

75 Id. at 44-45. Chintamun used the term khutbee to refer to this guarantee of the truth. Khutbe,
as it usually is transposed, is more commonly translated from the Arabic as “prayer,” but I have not been
able to find a suitable definition that indicates its use in colonial India as a legal or judicial term.
Reverend Joseph Wolff, who sought to convert the Jews of Palestine and Syria, however, defines it as a
material engagement “promise” as reflected in the early nineteenth-century Missionary Journal of the
Rev. Joseph Wolff. I have therefore adapted this usage of the term. See 2 JOSEPH WOLFF, MISSIONARY
JOURNAL AND MEMOIR OF THE REV. JOSEPH WOLFF 197 (New York, E. Bliss and M. White, 1824).
76 Mr. Morris, Replies to Supplemental Queries, supra note 42, at 60-64.
77 Id. at 69-71.
78 Id. at 48-49.
79 Id. at 44-45, 48-49.
80 Id. at 60-64.
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easy and justifiable.”81 Similarly, recommendations were made to remedy
the perceived problem of frivolous litigation, that is, the practice whereby
litigants applied for a panchayat only in order to prolong judicial
proceedings and delay judgment.82 Wishnoo, an amin himself, therefore
suggested that amins should be authorized to proceed by summary
judgment in suits whenever “the justice of litigiousness . . . is clear.”83
Finally, Anunrow proposed that panchayat meetings be held only at
the courthouse (cutcherry) “to act as a check against evasion.”84 Otherwise,
he noted:
[I]f the Plaintiff of Defendant are asked any questions by the
Punchayet they will not give direct or proper answers; one says he will
tomorrow, and in this manner procrastinate; the Plaintiff and defendant
occasionally absent themselves altogether and a Punchayet entirely
composed of persons not in the employment of Government, has no
power over them: Punchayets should therefore sit where the Aumeen
is, instead of in the Bazar [sic] or purgunnah where he cannot be to
give them instructions; if the Punchayet sits in presence of the Sircar
and any hindrance takes place, an order can be readily given and the
Punchayet will not be delayed.85
Therefore, in almost all instances, the Pune judicial and resident legal
experts recommended greater government scrutiny, greater government
supervision, and greater government interference in order to ensure the
efficacy of panchayats. Perhaps this should have been expected. These
were, after all, government-appointed judicial officers and high-ranking
legal scholars, most of whom had previously served the Peshwa.86
However, their view from the top coincided to an extraordinary degree with
the perspective of the leading officer-officials of the British occupation.87
Thus it should not be surprising to discover that a great many of the
recommendations proposed by the shastris and amins found their way into
British judicial policy.
By January 1823, Elphinstone had become convinced that further and
much more significant reforms of the panchayat were needed. Writing from
the field, he reluctantly admitted that the panchayat had failed to live up to
his expectations and instead had exhibited all of the potential weaknesses he
81
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87 Extract of a Minute by the Governor (January 14, 1823), in INDIA OFFICE RECORDS: BOARD’S
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had warned of in his Report on the Territories Conquered from the
Paishwa. “The Judicial arrangements, I am sorry to say, have not been so
successful as the Revenue,” Elphinstone wrote:
Few causes have been decided, and those with considerable delay and
dissatisfaction to all concerned. . . . The Punchayet on which so much
depends under the Native System, has shewn all the inconveniences
ascribed to it in my report of 1819, while the remedies applied to them
have been less efficacious than was then expected.88
He remained convinced, however, that the problems could not be
solved by more intensive British supervision or more extensive
intervention. Like Munro, Elphinstone believed that Indian customs and
practices lay beyond the comprehension of most British officials. “It is
indeed one of the great inconveniences of the system of Punchayets,” he
wrote:
[T]hat it is so ill adapted to European Superintendence; the want of
regularity in the proceedings of Punchayets make them difficult to
revise; their decisions being founded on traditional maxims are not
easily understood by a foreigner; no European improvements can be
grafted on a traditionary [sic] body of law, and no hope can be
entertained in such circumstances of ever framing a simple Code, alike
intelligible to the Judge and to the people.89
Elphinstone concluded, therefore, that a greater number of Indian civil
magistrates (munsifs) with summary jurisdiction needed to be employed and
that a stricter set of rules was required for panchayats. He summarized the
plan that would be adopted later in the year:
The principal features in the plan are, that the number of Moonsifs is
encreased; that the Moonsifs are empowered to try all causes, not
specially excepted, without obtaining the previous consent of both
parties; that Punchayets are confined to particular classes of causes,
unless when both parties desire that mode of trial; that the Members of
Punchayets are named from a rotation list, when they cannot otherwise
be procured; that it is obligatory to serve on Punchayets; that greater
strictness and regularity of proceeding is introduced, and greater
facilities given to appeals both from Moonsifs & Punchayets.90
The 1823 reforms therefore restricted the original jurisdiction of
panchayats to ten specific classes of suits, including those regarding local
customs and privileges, marriage, maintenance, partition of property, “old
88
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and intricate” accounts, and disputes involving less than fifty Rupees.91
Thus, the panchayat’s authority was limited generally to administering
family disputes, small debts, and questions of local customs. Even in this
much more limited sphere of action, litigants were not required to initiate
their cases before a local panchayat.92 Instead, if they preferred to do so,
they could submit a written request to have their case heard by one of the
new munsifs.93 The responsibility for hearing suits concerning larger debts
and property disputes, except those regarding village boundaries, also
shifted to the civil magistrates and district officers, both of whom were also
authorized to convene panchayats if they deemed it necessary.94 However,
ultimate authority was reserved for the Collector. No panchayat award
could be executed without his authorization.95
The new rules did not so much displace the panchayat as the principal
locus of justice as to restrict its independence, limit its jurisdiction, and
regularize its procedures within the administrative structure of the British
judiciary. In the courts of the mamledars and munsifs, for example,
panchayats were restricted to no more than five members.96 The sarpanch
was to be jointly selected by the litigants, but, if they could not agree, then
one was to be appointed for them. Litigants were required to sign both a
razeenamah, now interpreted as an “arbitration deed,” as well as a “penalty
bond,”97 the latter of which subjected the plaintiff to a maximum fine of ten
percent of the value of the claim, if they failed “to substantiate their
allegations.”98 This fine was intended to prevent frivolous litigation. In one
sense, such a fine was not altogether new, but it is another example of the
extraordinary ways in which customary procedures were constantly being
redefined for contemporary ends. Under the Peshwa’s government, such
fines, called goonhangari, had been levied as a penalty upon the party who
lost their cause. Here, however, the British shifted the burden entirely onto
the plaintiff who became solely subject to the potential fine in order to
inhibit litigation.
91 Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, 6 RULES RESPECTING PUNCHAYETS 9498 (1829) (Maharashtra State Archives). The ten categories were: religion, marriage, peculiar customs of
places, hereditary estates (watans) and privileges (huks), division of property, maintenance, old and
intricate accounts, disputes between two inhabitants of the same village for personal property worth less
than fifty Rupees, personal injuries or other personal damages, and boundary disputes. A reliable
overview of the administrative changes in the panchayat system under British rule in the Deccan is
provided by SINGH, supra note 5, at ch. 5.
92 See generally Judicial Dep’t, supra note 91.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id.
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Further restrictions were placed upon the panchayat intended to
routinize their proceedings. Panchayat deliberations were limited to three
months, after which both parties had to agree in writing to an extension.99
If they could not agree, the case was then sent before the Collector or a
British magistrate for summary justice.100 Panchayat members were to be
drawn from among “respectable people of the class or degree of the
parties.”101 However, if no one was willing to volunteer their services, then
rotation lists were to be created of respectable people, such as the hereditary
police and revenue officers (desmukhs), hereditary revenue accountants
(despandes), and other hereditary landholders.102 Those who refused to
serve when called upon became subject to a fine of up to five Rupees.103 If
witnesses or litigants failed to appear upon the summons of a panchayat,
they became subject to fines of two Rupees.104 Plaintiffs who continued to
fail to appear could be non-suited with costs while a defendant’s failure to
appear could result in the panchayat proceeding ex parte.105
It should be clear, therefore, that rather than reviving the panchayat
according to the customs of the country, what had developed within the
space of five years was largely a hybrid of British arbitration practices and
British law-court procedures that was called a “panchayat.” Perhaps not
surprisingly, this does not appear to have been apparent to even its most
ardent advocates. Elphinstone himself did not find it paradoxical that in his
Report on the Territories Conquered from the Paishwa he recommended
both that the panchayat “must continue to be exempt from all new forms,
interference and regulation on our part” and, at the same time, that action
needed to be taken “to remove [the panchayat’s] abuses and revive its
energy.”106 He appears to have believed that changes in “the mere
administration of the law” could only improve, and not radically alter, the
panchayat.107 Similarly, William Chaplin, Elphinstone’s successor, as
Commissioner of the Deccan and also a keen proponent of the panchayat
system, noted, “it is obvious that if left to work spontaneously, without a
well regulated authority to stimulate them to action, they can be of very
little utility as Engines of Justice.”108 However, it does not appear that
99
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Id.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 ELPHINSTONE, supra note 13, at 99.
107 Id.
108 Letter of William Chaplin to Elphinstone, (23 March 1822), in BOMBAY JUDICIAL
CONSULTATIONS, IOR/P/399/12 (1822) (British Library).
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either Elphinstone or Chaplin understood that the imposition of a “well
regulated authority” would inevitably reshape the form and function of the
panchayat system.
Ironically, one of the few instances in which this inherent contradiction
in panchayat policy was recognized came from the East India Company’s
Judicial Department in London. Their observations are worth quoting at
length for they emphasize the logical flaw in attempting to incorporate what
was assumed to be a voluntary system of dispute resolution into a formal
system of judicature. Unfortunately for the Bombay Presidency, the
relevant passage quoted here was later excised from the Department’s final
version of the dispatch:
Suits in which the parties can be persuaded to agree may be
conveniently determined by arbitration, and if the Punchayet were
restricted to this, which no doubt was its original function, it would
perfectly answer the purpose, and would still be regarded with
affection by the Natives, but the great mass of litigation consists of
cases in which the enforcement of a claim is peremptorily insisted on
by one party or pertinaciously resisted by another. For the decision of
all such Suits, whatever the subject of the claim may be, there should
be regular Courts, freely accessible to the people and subject to
safeguards for the due observance of the Law. Till these are
established there is no general protection. To refuse their aid to a
Suitor, sending him to arbitration against his will, is to deny him
justice.
The objects of arbitration and those of Judicature are so essentially
different, and the means best adapted to the one are so ill calculated for
the other, that every attempt to assimilate them must be impracticable.
The superintending and regulating of Punchayets by Officers of
Government, are represented as necessary to their success, but, by the
interference of authority, these bodies are rendered unfit for arbitration
without being made fit for judicature.109
The 1823 reforms did little to improve the efficiency of the panchayat
or to reduce the backlog of cases in the British courts of justice and, by
1827, the panchayat experiment in the Bombay Presidency had been
deemed a failure. Between 1819 and 1827, less than five percent of all
cases in the Presidency were adjudicated before a panchayat.110 Therefore,
the new Elphinstone Code of 1827 relegated the panchayat to a marginal
109 Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, Administration of Justice in the Deccan,
in BOMBAY DISPATCHES, 486-89, IOR/E/4/1047 (1827) (British Library).
110 Calculations based on surviving data in the Annual and Periodical Reports in the Company’s
Civil Judicature files are preserved in the Maharashtra State Archives and supplemented by reports
surviving in the Bombay Judicial Consultations files at the British Library.
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and very subsidiary role as an aid to British judges who might or might not
seek their advice. In a rare moment of reflection, Elphinstone appeared to
regret the fact that the entire superstructure of British governance in India
was tending to destroy what he believed to be the traditional village
community. “The native system,” he wrote shortly before he retired as
Governor,
may long be tried with success in a moderate portion of an extensive
Government at a distance from the Presidency and out of the
neighbourhood of a supreme Court, but in a country situated like ours
in the Deckan, it is in vain to attempt to preserve that system
unimpaired.
The first effect of the introduction of forms and the divisions of
authority, is, I think, very unfavorable to the natives. They have no
longer any head to look up to. Each person being charged with a
Department, no one looks after the whole, and it is only in the duties
connected with Justice, Revenue or Police that our functionaries come
in contact with any class of the Natives. The effect of these
circumstances is already observable in the Deckan. The intercourse
between those of the higher orders and Europeans is already much less
than it used to be and will probably diminish with every new arrival.111
Whether the local, voluntary, and informal panchayat that the British
imagined had been characteristic of India’s ancient constitution could ever
have been made an effective tool for the dispensation of justice is a moot
albeit highly contentious point. It is clear though that British attempts to
“revive” and “purify” the panchayat to serve their judicial administration
made it increasingly less flexible and bound by an increasingly more
complex set of procedural rules, all of which were based upon the
assumption that Indians preferred to settle disputes through some form of a
community-based arbitration forum rather than seek a winner-take-all
decision in the British courts. This is not to say that access to justice was
better or worse under the new British-style panchayat or that substantive
justice was better or worse served by these changes. It is to say, however,
that the British attempts to resuscitate the imagined ancient panchayat
inevitably killed the patient.
Once again, the Company’s Court of Directors in London understood
this inherent contradiction although their imagining of the panchayat was
based wholly upon their preconception of the Maratha system of justice as
well as their own understanding of English legal custom and practices. As

111 Papers of East India Company, Judicial Department, Extract of the Honorable the
Governor’s Minute dated the 4th January, connected with his late visit to the Deccan, in 10 DECCAN
NEW JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENT 486-89 (1827) (Maharashtra State Archives).
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the failure of Elphinstone’s panchayat experiment increasingly became
apparent, they wrote of “the true and correct idea of the Punchayet.”112
Under the Marathas, they explained, people preferred to avoid the
government’s courts:
Not choosing to go before such imperfect tribunals, they had recourse
to a plan of settling their disputes among themselves, the plan general
throughout India, that of referring them to private arbitration. The
whole of the proceeding was voluntary. The parties resorted to it by
mutual agreement, and they had recourse to such Arbitrators as they
could induce to undertake the arbitration. This was not an institution of
the Government, it was an expedient of the people to supersede an
institution of the Government which they could not trust, or to supply
the place of one where it did not exist. It was to mistake the nature of
this expedient of Individuals to make it an institution of Govt. and the
attempt has accordingly failed.113
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See generally Administration of Justice in the Deccan, supra note 109.
Id. Perhaps it was the harshness of this evaluation that later led to the excision of this
paragraph from the final version of the dispatch.
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